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3 
Plaintiffs Amy and David Mallenbaum, on behalf of themselves and others similarly 
situated, sued defendant Adelphia Communications Corporation ("Adelphia") in district 
court challenging its monthly fee to cable subscribers who receive programming on more 
than one television set.  Plaintiffs claim that this fee is an impermissible equipment 
charge under Title VI of the 1992 Cable Act ("Cable Act" or "Act"), 47 U.S.C. §§ 521
and a regulation promulgated thereunder, 47 C.F.R. § 76.923. That regulation requires that 
charges for multiple outlets be based on actual cost.  Plaintiffs advance their challenge 
by two different means.    
 Plaintiffs first assert an express right of action. Under 47 U.S.C. § 401(b
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") "orders" may be directly 
enforced by private parties in district court.  According to plaintiffs, §76.923 should be 
construed as a direct "order" to cable operators giving rise to an express right of 
action.  Plaintiffs also assert an implied right of action under Section 3 of the 1992 
Cable Act to contest the outlet charge.  The district court concluded that plaintiffs had 
neither an express nor an implied right of action.  It therefore dismissed the action for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.2        
 We hold that plaintiffs lack an express right of action under 401(b) because an 
agency regulation is not a privately enforceable 401(b) order unless it requires the 
defendant to take a particular action.  Section 76.923 does not require defendant Adelphia 
to take any action with regard to additional outlet prices.  Moreover, plaintiffs do not 
have an implied right of action under the Cable Act because the Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 
(1975), factors are not met.  We therefore affirm.  Inasmuch as we resolve the case in 
this fashion, we need not decide whether or not Adelphia's additional outlet fee is based 
                     
2
 Although the district court couched some of its discussion in terms of standing 
and, at one point, styled its dismissal as a judgment on the pleadings, fairly read, the 
court actually dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. 
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on actual cost, for even if the charge was not based on actual cost, plaintiffs have no 
cause to complain.   
 I. Facts  
 The 1992 Cable Act covers three types of cable television service:  basic, cable 
programming, and premium. Basic service includes all broadcast signals and all public, 
educational, and government access channels carried by the system.  All cable subscribers 
must purchase basic service. Cable programming service is video programming provided over 
a cable system other than on a per-channel or per-program basis.3 Premium service, offered 
on a per-channel or per-program basis, includes movie channels (e.g., HBO or Cinemax) and 
cultural and sporting events (e.g., pay-per-view concerts or prize fights). 
 Basic service rates may be regulated by a local franchising authority according 
to regulations promulgated by the FCC if the authority certifies to the Commission that it 
has the necessary authority and resources.  47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2)-(3); 47 C.F.R. 76.922.  
Under 47 C.F.R. § 76.923, local franchising authorities that choose to regulate (they need 
not do so) must limit charges for multiple cable television receivers to actual cost.
the local franchising authority does not file a certification with the FCC, basic service 
rates remain unregulated.  If the FCC rejects or revokes franchising authority 
certification, the FCC regulates basic service rates until the authority is certified or 
recertified.  47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(4)-(6).  The FCC has sole authority to regulate rates for 
cable programming service.  47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2).  Under the 1992 Cable Act, premium 
rates are unregulated.      
 After passage of the 1992 Cable Act, Adelphia notified its customers that it 
would charge $.95 per month for each outlet (beyond the first) that received any 
                     
3
 Cable programming service includes a bundle of several channels.  For instance, 
if basic service only offered channels such as CNN, C-SPAN, and MTV, cable programming 
service might offer a package of additional channels such as ESPN, CNN Headline News, and 
C-SPAN 2.          
4
 See infra note 6 and surrounding text. 
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combination of cable television services.  Plaintiffs, in their district court action, 
argued that this charge violated the FCC regulation that limits rates for basic service on 
multiple television outlets to actual cost.  47 C.F.R. § 76.923.  The Mallenbaum's local 
franchising authority, the Township of Upper Dublin (PA), has not applied for 
certification to regulate these rates.  The plaintiffs assert, however, an express and an 
implied right of action to enforce §76.923.        
II. Discussion 
 A. Express Right of Action 
 Section 401(b) gives private individuals an express right to enforce FCC 
"orders."  The statute provides: 
If any person fails or neglects to obey any order of the Commission other than 
for the payment of money, while the same is in effect, the Commission or any 
party injured thereby, or the United States, by its Attorney General, may apply 
to the appropriate district court of the United States for the enforcement of 
such order.  If, after hearing, the court determines that the order was 
regularly made and duly served, and that the person is in disobedience of the 
same, the court shall enforce obedience to such order by a writ of injunction or 
other proper process, mandatory or otherwise, to restrain such person or the 
officers, agents, or representatives of such person, from disobedience of such 
order, or to enjoin upon it or them obedience to the same. 
47 U.S.C. § 401(b) (emphasis added).  Thus, if the regulation regarding additional outlet 
charges, 47 C.F.R § 76.923, is an "order," plaintiffs would have the right to seek its 
enforcement in district court. 
 In determining whether an agency rule is an "order" under § 401(b), courts have 
generally used Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416
(1942) [hereinafter "CBS"], as a starting point.  While CBS involved a different statutor
provision, 47 U.S.C. § 402(a),5 that case set forth the principle that whether an agency 
regulation is an "order" depends on the nature of the rule and its impact on litigants.  
Specifically, an agency regulation should be considered an "order" if it requires a 
defendant to take concrete actions.     
                     
5
 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) sets forth the procedures to "enjoin, set aside, annul, or 
suspend" any order of the Commission. 
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 This principle led the Ninth Circuit to conclude in Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. 
Public Utilities Commission, 827 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1987), that the FCC rule there at 
issue should be deemed an "order" under § 401(b).  Because the rule in that case required 
a particular action to be taken by the defendant (namely, that defendant Hawaii Public 
Utilities Commission follow certain procedures to separate costs and investments among 
interstate and intrastate telephone services), the rule was "appropriately interpreted as 
an 'order'" enforceable by a private party against the defendant in district court.  
at 1272.6    
 Conversely, the CBS principle led this Court to conclude in PBW Stock Exchange, 
Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 732 (3d Cir. 1973), that the SEC rule in question was not 
enforceable under a provision of the Securities Exchange Act allowing judicial review of 
SEC "orders."  Noting that the rule at issue was more akin to a general rulemaking than to 
an order, in that it was prospective and unrelated to specific rights and obligations of 
the litigants, we concluded that federal jurisdiction was absent.  Id. at 732-733.  
 In the instant case, § 76.923 does not order defendant Adelphia (or other cable 
companies like it) to charge specific rates.  Rather, given the statutory framework, it is 
clear that this regulation is addressed not to cable operators but to local franchising 
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 Other circuits including the Sixth Circuit in Alltel Tennessee, Inc. v. 
Tennessee Public Service Commission, 913 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1990) and the Seventh 
Circuit in Illinois Bell Telephone, Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 740 F.2d 566, 571 
(7th Cir. 1984) support the Ninth Circuit approach.  According to the First Circuit, 
however, only orders that are judicial in nature afford plaintiffs a private right of 
enforcement under §401(b).  This approach was enunciated by Judge Breyer in New England 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 742 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).  
That opinion relied on the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") which defines "order" as 
"a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, 
of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking."  5 U.S.C. § 551(6).  Although the APA was 
enacted after the 1934 Communications Act, the court used the APA as "a guide in 
determining the proper construction of pre-existing, related procedural statutes--at least 
where other non-APA considerations also point clearly in the same direction."  Id. at 5.  
For the First Circuit, these considerations were, inter alia, protecting agency autonomy 
and maintaining a coherent communications policy.  We need not choose between the First 
Circuit and Ninth Circuit approaches, for, even assuming arguendo that some rules may be 
considered orders under § 401(b), the FCC rule at issue here may not.    
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authorities.  See 47 U.S.C. 543(a)(2)-(3), (6).7 Thus, while § 76.923 offers guidelin
be followed by local franchising authorities that decide to regulate a cable company's 
fees for additional outlets, it does not in itself require particular actions to be taken 
by defendant Adelphia.  Therefore, following the principle enunciated in CBS and its 
progeny, §76.923 is not an "order" under § 401(b).    
 Furthermore, as we have noted, the Mallenbaums' local franchising authority has 
not applied for certification.  Thus, under the 1992 Cable Act, Adelphia's rates for 
additional outlets remain unregulated.  See supra note 6.  As § 76.923 is inapplicable to 
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 Section 76.923 is referenced by § 76.922, which in turn refers back to the 
language of 47 U.S.C. § 543.  That section provides: 
 
(2) Preference for competition. . . . If the Commission finds that a 
cable system is not subject to effective competition-- 
 
 (A) the rates for the provision of basic cable service shall be 
subject to regulation by a franchising authority, or by the Commission 
if the Commission exercises jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph (6), in 
accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Commission under 
subsection (b) of this section . . . 
  
  . . . . 
 
(3)  Qualification of franchising authority. A franchising authority 
that seeks to exercise regulatory jurisdiction permitted under 
paragraph (2)(A) shall file with the Commission a written 
certification . . . .  
 
  . . . . 
 
(6)  Exercise of jurisdiction by Commission. If the Commission 
disapproves a franchising  
authority's certification . . . or revokes such authority's 
jurisdiction . . . the Commission shall exercise the franchising 
authority's regulatory jurisdiction under paragraph (2)(A) until the 
franchising authority has qualified to exercise that jurisdiction by 
filing a new certification that meets the requirements of paragraph 
(3).  
47 U.S.C. 543(a)(2)-(3), (6) (emphasis added in paragraph 2(A)). Thus, under § 543, the 
franchising authority or (in particular circumstances) the Commission may regulate in 
accordance with the provisions set forth in § 76.923.  
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Adelphia, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim.  For these reasons, plaintiffs have no 
express right of action.   
 B. Implied Right of Action 
 We hold further that plaintiffs have no implied right of action under the Act.  
In making this determination we use the four factor test set out in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 
66 (1975). These factors are: 
(1) whether plaintiff is a member of the class "for whose especial 
benefit the statute was enacted"; 
 
(2) whether there is evidence of legislative intent to create or preclude the 
relief sought; 
 
(3) whether the relief sought is consistent with the legislative scheme; 
 
(4) whether the relief sought is the type that is "traditionally relegated" to 
states, such that federal relief would interfere with the state scheme. 
Id. at 78.  Recent case law makes clear that the focus of our inquiry should be on the 
first two factors.  See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 
(1979); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. M/V Cape Fear and M/V Little Gull, 967 F.2d 864, 866 
(3d Cir. 1992).  It is clear that the Cable Act was not created for the especial benefit 
of the plaintiffs.  Subscribers residing in areas where no local franchising authority has 
sought FCC licensing are not intended to benefit from the 1992 Act, since rates in such 
municipalities are not regulated.  As to the second factor, Congress surely did not intend 
to give plaintiffs a private right of action to enforce the regulations.  Rather, in
situations like this, Congress intended for rates to remain unregulated.  Since the first 
two Cort factors do not support the finding of an implied right, plaintiffs do not have an 
implied right of action under the Cable Act to enforce § 76.923.    
 The order of the district court will be affirmed.   
